Currency crises appear to spread regionally. In this paper we use Bayesian methodology on data from four waves of currency crises in the late twentieth century to examine the mechanism by which currency crises spread from one country to another. In particular, we examine whether trade linkages, "other" unquantifiable linkages proxied for by relative geographical distance, or macroeconomic and financial similarity are important (separately and together) in determining the direction of spread of currency crises. Our results on trade links represent a Bayesian reworking of the results presented in Glick and Rose (1998). Our examination of other forms of linkages extends and sharpens their analysis. Our results suggest that trade linkages are consistently important in determining the spread of currency crises, as are, to a lesser extent, macroeconomic and financial similarity. However, we find that in comparison geographical distance is not a good indicator for the spread of crises. In this paper we apply some relatively recent techniques in the Bayesian analysis of binary data that allow us to overcome small sample biases and meaningfully collate lessons across waves of currency crises. The econometric methodology highlighted in this paper is hitherto unused in the empirical literature on currency crises and bank runs and is widely applicable to the same. * I thank John Rust and Giancarlo Corsetti for their advice. I am grateful to Hugo Benítez-Silva for his help with Gauss and for general encouragement and support.
Introduction
Several waves of excess volatility in currency markets in the last decade of the twentieth century have drawn attention to the fact that currency crises appear to "spread" regionally. In repeated instances, from the early 1970s to the late 1990s, we have observed that when speculative pressure leads to a crisis in one country, market volatility spreads to other countries in the region and elsewhere. If we agree that currency crises tend to spread from one country to another, it is of interest to learn something about the mechanism that drives this spread. Do currency crises spread along geographical lines? Do they spread along trade channels? Is the spread of currency crises simply an example of irrational panics on the part of exchange rate speculators? The answers to these questions are of significance from a theoretical standpoint. In addition, from a policy perspective, understanding the mechanism of spread of currency crises is important in anticipating and preventing them.
In this paper we have two goals. First, we attempt to provide partial answers to some of these questions. While doing so, we also seek to apply a set of relatively new Bayesian econometric techniques hitherto unused in the empirical literature on currency crises. However, before we begin to summarize what we do, it is important to point out what we don't. The alleged phenomenon of the spread of currency crises between countries is often referred to as contagion. There is some debate in the literature as to whether contagion exists (see, for example, Forbes and Rigobon 1999) . It is impossible to "prove" the existence of contagion using econometric techniques because we can never rule out some common, global shock in some unobserved (possibly unknown) variable or linear (or non-linear) combination of variables. While attempts have been made to do so, notably by Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) , and also in a preliminary study by Dasgupta (1998) , all of this work is subject to the "common shock in unobserved variables" critique. The best one can do is to claim that it is very unlikely that scattered currency crises can be attributed to global shocks. Most market participants, however, agree on the existence of contagion. Some recent micro-theoretic work (Allen and Gale 2000, Morris 1997 , and Dasgupta 2000 for example) provide (albeit highly stylized) structural backing to the existence of contagion in market equilibrium. In this paper, we do not seek to enter the existential debate on contagion. We assume that it exists. Let us agree at the outset that there is some mechanism by which currency crises tend to spread from one country to another. The analysis that follows seeks to learn about this mechanism.
We are not the first to attempt this. Glick and Rose (1999) address this question. Our analysis follows closely in the spirit of theirs, and overlaps non-trivially in content. A large part of our data is taken from the data used for that paper 1 and we are exclusively dependent on them for the identification of currency crises. Part of our exercise, therefore, is a Bayesian reworking of part of their results. However, we do not stop there. The rest of our analysis extends and sharpens the analysis of Glick and Rose (1999) , in a manner that we explain below. From a technical econometric standpoint, a major distinction between their paper and ours is in the choice of Bayesian versus Classical technique. We shall motivate and explicate this point in detail later.
Macroeconomic theories differ on the channels by which currency crises spread between countries. One set of theories (e.g. Corsetti, Pesenti, Roubini, and Tille 1998, Gerlach and Smets 1994) point to trade linkages as being the determinant of the direction of spread of currency crises. Their basic argument is that once a particular country experiences a currency crisis and devalues its domestic currency, its exports become more competitive and thus hurts the economies of its trade competitors. Financial speculators may then find it more attractive to attack the currencies of these potentially weakened countries. Another set of theories (e.g. Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco 1996) posit that it is macroeconomic structural similarity between the countries that render them equally vulnerable to coordinated attack by currency traders. Thus, according to these theories, crises spread to countries with similar fundamentals. Other theories point to other forms of links or perceived links between countries. For example, Goldfajn and Valdes (1997) posit that institutional connections visà vis cross-country financial links explain contagion. Rigobon (1998) suggests that the regionality of currency crises can be caused by investors learning about a given model of development, since development models tend to be regional.
Given this multiplicity of explanations for the mechanism of contagion, we shall attempt to empirically distinguish between the theories. Glick and Rose (1999) provide evidence in favor of the trade-link theories, but do not explicitly demonstrate that their conclusions favor one class of theories over the others. We shall provide evidence to corroborate their results on trade links using Bayesian techniques. Then we shall extend their data and analysis to provide (albeit indirect) evidence for or against the other two classes of theories. In particular, we shall concentrate on how the various explanations fare when they are considered simultaneously on the same data set.
It is relatively straightforward to test the hypothesis of whether contagion is caused by trade. Once the succession of victims of a crisis wave has been determined, this can be done by establishing some measure of trade competitiveness between countries affected (and not affected) by the wave. Glick and Rose (1999) do so. We replicate their analysis but with Bayesian techniques which are delineated below. However, looking exclusively at trade competitiveness can be misleading. While trade linkages would explain the regionality of currency crises, this could be caused by other factors too. For example, institutional connectionsà là Goldfajn and Valdes (1997) or development model-specific learningà là Rigobon (1998) would also lead to geographical clustering. In addition, if contagion was caused by irrational capital flight or herd behavior out of a particular region, this would also lead to geographical clustering of crises. Many of these "other" factors are difficult to quantify. While institutional linkages are quantifiable, data is not readily available. However, these factors can collectively be proxied for by the relative geographical distance between countries. Institutional linkages are likely to diminish with increasing distance. Since development models tend to be regional, effects from model-specific learning should also be linked to geographical distance. Thus in order to sharpen the hypothesis that trade competition matters, we examine the question of whether relative geographical distance is a significant determinant of contagion. Then we also examine whether the trade connection has relevance over and above the geographical connection when the (competing) explanations are both applied to the same data simultaneously. This extends the analysis of Glick and Rose (1999) by separating the trade links from potential "other" links along the lines described above. Finally, we also examine the question of whether macroeconomic similarity matters, and whether the trade connection matters after taking macroeconomic and financial similarity into account. While Glick and Rose do make passing reference to this question, they present no detailed results explicitly. Moreover they do not conduct any analysis based on the same data that they (and we) use for the trade regressions. We construct an ad hoc similarity index based upon the same data as we use for the trade regressions to examine the question.
Following Glick and Rose we analyze cross sectional data on currency crises from four waves of volatility in exchange rates: the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System in 1971, the collapse of the Smithsonian Agreement in 1973, the European Monetary System crisis of 1992, and the Mexican Peso crisis of 1994.
Our analysis differs radically from Glick and Rose (1999) in its choice of econometric methodology. Based upon existing models of currency crises, which posit important roles for domestic macroeconomic fundamentals as determinants of currency crises, it is essential to include several domestic macroeconomic variables as control regressors in our analysis. However, the introduction of macroeconomic variables severely limits our sample size due to the non-availability of data. Glick and Rose have sample sizes of 50, 60, 67, and 67 respectively for the four waves of currency crises outlined above. These are small samples, and thus the resulting coefficient estimates of the Binary Probit model that they use may not be reliable (see, for example, Zellner and Rossi 1984, and Griffiths, Hill, and Pope 1987). In order to get around the problem posed by limited data availability, we use Bayesian methodology introduced by Albert and Chibb (1993) to analyze binary and polychotomous data. These techniques get around small sample problems by using iterative Monte Carlo methods, namely, Gibbs Sampling/Data Augmentation. Using these techniques we are able to simulate from the exact posterior distribution of the parameters of interest, and test hypotheses and significance levels with greater precision. We produce counterparts to Glick and Rose's classical estimates using Bayesian estimation with improper priors. We are also able to collate information efficiently across crisis periods by using Bayesian updating with informative priors, which allows for greater precision in our final estimate.
Through this paper we seek to highlight the Bayesian analysis of binary data in the context of currency crises. Since currency crises are (fortunately) low probability events, available sample sizes are extremely limited (fixed and small N , small T ). Thus, in the near future it is unlikely that there shall be enough data from crisis periods to conduct satisfactory classical analysis (relying on N → ∞ or T → ∞ asymptotics). Also, since volatility occurs in financial markets in waves, it is of interest to properly collate information across waves of crises. The Bayesian framework allows for such explicit collation, since posteriors from one wave of crises can be used as informative priors for analyzing the next wave. The methodology presented in Albert and Chibb (1993) and highlighted in this paper is widely applicable to the analysis of currency crises, stock market booms and busts, and bank runs.
Our results are broadly in support of trade competition as the central channel for the spread of currency crises. Our Bayesian counterparts to Glick and Rose's estimates provide strong support for their results, while correcting for small sample biases in their methodology. In our analysis of relative geographical distance, we find that currency crises are not regional in a strict sense, and that the trade connection is important even after accounting for "other" connections proxied for by relative geographical distance. Finally, we find that macroeconomic similarity is important in determining the direction of spread of currency crises, even in the presence of trade connections as an explanatory variable. However, this effect is numerically smaller than the effect due to trade competitiveness. Broadly, therefore, our analysis provides support for the theories of Corsetti, Pesenti, Roubini, and Tille (1998) and Gerlach and Smets (1994) , some support for the theories of Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996) , and no evidence in support of Rigobon (1998) and Goldfajn and Valdes (1997) . In fairness to these latter theories, however, it has to be said that our analysis does not directly test for the predictions of their models, but rather provides indirect evidence against them through the proxy of geographical distance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out our estimation strategy and section 3 delineates the data used and explicates the computation of indices where necessary. Section 4 explains the central Bayesian methodology of our analysis. Section 5 provides a summary of our results as well as keys to understanding the layout of our tables. Finally, section 6 concludes with some interpretation of our results and discusses possible extensions.
Estimation Strategy
Our estimation strategy 2 is identical to that of Glick and Rose (1999) . A central assumption of their strategy is that all waves of currency crises begin at some identifiable point: Some country gets attacked first. Crises in other countries follow. Following them we shall refer to this country as the first victim of a crisis wave. We shall call the other countries followers. The starting point of their strategy is to identify the first victim of each crisis wave under consideration, and then to identify the followers in the wave. Our interest is in explicating the mechanism by which currency crises spread from the first victim to the followers. Therefore, once we have identified the first victim and the followers in a crisis wave, the appropriate use of relevant information about the interconnections amongst these countries will permit us to extract lessons about the mechanism by which currency crises spread. Once the first victim has been attacked, what determines which countries shall become followers?
The general question, then, is what determines the probability that a particular country shall become a follower as a function of a certain set of "relevant" variables. Abstracting away from specifics, let us denote by x i , a 1 × K vector of variables associated with country i. Let y i be a scalar that is 1 if a crisis occurs in i, and 0 if it does not. In order to explore the connection between the probability that a crisis occurs in i and the values of the relevant variables x i , we use a Binary Probit Model, i.e., P r(y i = 1) = Φ(x i β) i = 1, ..., N 2 but not econometric technique where β is a K × 1 vector of coefficients corresponding to the K variables associated with i and Φ() denotes the standard Gaussian (Normal) CDF.
The economic content of our analysis lies in the choice of variables x i . In choosing x i , we look for ways in which potential followers may be connected to the first victim. We shall propose various ways for doing this, but first we need to specify a set of control variables. Economic theories of currency crises, both of the first generation (e.g. Krugman 1979, Flood and Garber 1984) and (to a lesser extent) of the second (e.g. Obstfeld 1986 and 1998, Morris and Shin 1998) point to the importance of macroeconomic and financial variables associated with a country i in determining whether a currency crisis will occur in i. The specific mechanisms by which these variables matter differs across various models 3 . However, it has become common practice in the empirical literature on currency crises to use the following set of macroeconomic variables to proxy for domestic determinants of currency crises: the rate of increase in domestic credit, the government's budget position as a fraction of gross domestic product, the current account position as a fraction of gross domestic product, the rate of real growth of the economy, the ratio of M2 to Central Bank foreign reserves, and the level of consumer price inflation in the economy. We follow Eighengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995 and , and Glick and Rose (1999) in including this set of macroeconomic variables in our analysis. These variables are a measure of why country i might suffer a currency crisis due to factors that do not depend on its connections to the first victim. They serve as a set of control variables in our regressions.
Having identified the domestic macroeconomic control variables to be used for the analysis, we are now ready to tackle the question of what forms of connections to the first victim might make a potential follower more likely to suffer a currency attack. There are several approaches to this question and we deal with four such ways, which we enumerate below.
Approach 1:
The most obvious link to address, perhaps, is the trade link. Currency crises appear to be regional upon casual observation, and trade is primarily a regional phenomenon. Besides, a currency crisis in the first victim typically leads to a devaluation in the first victim's currency and thus makes its exports more competitive relative to its trade competitors. This might lead to a weakening of the economies of these trade competitors in the view of international currency speculators, and thus make these trade competitors more vulnerable to speculative attacks. This is similar, roughly speaking, to the basic argument in Corsetti, Pesenti, Roubini, and Tille (1999). Thus, the first question we address is: After controling for domestic macroeconomic variables, does trade competitiveness with the first victim make potential followers more vulnerable to speculative pressure? This is the question addressed in Glick and Rose (1999) . Our Bayesian counterparts to Glick and Rose's results are presented in Tables 2 through 5 .
Approach 2:
Having re-analyzed the question addressed in Glick and Rose (1999) we now address the question of "other" links between countries. While trade is an obvious connection to address, there may be several other connections, or perceived connections (in the minds of spec-ulators), between countries. There could be institutional connections for example (e.g. Goldfajn and Valdes 1997) , or simply social or cultural connections that would make potential followers "similar" to the first victim. While it is nearly impossible to quantify these other connections, it is possible to capture, to some extent, their joint effect by simply measuring geographical distance of potential followers from the first victim. For example, countries that are closer together are likely to be more institutionally connected and more culturally similar. Therefore, in the minds of currency speculators, they might be more attractive potential victims in a wave of currency attacks. Of course, what matters is the relative distance between countries, not the absolute distance. Thus, the second question we address is: After controlling for domestic macroeconomic variables, does relative geographical distance make potential followers more vulnerable to speculative pressure? Glick and Rose do not consider this question. Our results under this approach are captured in Tables 6 through 8 .
Approach 3:
Using relative distance alone may be misleading, however, since countries tend to trade more with their neighbors than with others. Thus, in order to separate the effects of trade and "other" connections, we need to consider the two variables together. In other words, the third question we address is: Once we control for domestic macroeconomic variables, does trade competitiveness make potential followers more vulnerable to speculative pressure even after accounting for "other" connections using relative geographical distance? Our results under this approach are captured in Tables 9 through 12. Approach 4: Finally, some economists (e.g. Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco 1996) take the view that it is macroeconomic and financial similarity between countries that drives the spread of currency crises. Thus, we also address the question, albeit in a cursory manner, of whether after controlling for domestic macroeconomic variables and macroeconomic similarity, if trade and/or "other" connections encapsulated in relative geographical distance matter in determining the level of speculative pressure on a potential follower. While Glick and Rose make passing reference to this question they do not explicitly provide detailed results and do not conduct any analysis based on the same data that they use for the trade regressions. Our approach constructs a macroeconomic similarity index from the data used in the trade regressions of Glick and Rose. Our results under this approach are captured in Tables 13 through 16 .
Having thus outlined the set of question we seek to answer, let us now proceed to describe the content of the data that we use in our analysis.
Data

Identifying Currency Crises
The portion of the data for which we are exclusively dependent on Glick and Rose (1999) is on the identification of currency crises and the keying off of first victims. There is a significant problem with identifying currency crises from data. One way to identify currency crises using short term data is to contruct indices of short term market rates (interest rates and exchange rates) and look for large jumps in these indices. 4 While such methodology is not without value, it is difficult to decide upon the relevant size of the jumps (for example, Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz 1996 use 1.5 standard deviation jumps from the mean, with no explanation for the criterion). Also, looking for jumps in time series data exposes the econometrician to the risk of double counting, since each currency crisis is typically characterized by more than one phase of devaluation and market disarray. Besides, short term financial data sometimes used to identify currency crises are most unreliable at exactly the times when crises occur. It is not uncommon for dual markets to develop and for bid-ask spreads to grow so large that mid-market values of variables are left essentially meaningless. It is also almost impossible to fully separate the effects of crisis response capital controls imposed in an ad hoc manner by central banks. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, looking purely at financial data excludes several other sources of information, such as newspaper reports and ex post academic analyses. The identification problem with currency crises is peculiar in that while it is is difficult to reliably locate currency crises in the data, the occurence of a crisis is essentially common knowledge amongst market analysts. In this paper, therefore, we do not attempt to identify currency crises from the data, but rather simply take Glick and Rose's identification as given. They base their identification on a variety of factors including "journalistic and academic histories of the various episodes." We also take as given their identification of the first victims of crisis waves.
We analyze four waves of speculative market pressure: The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, the collapse of the Smithsonian Agreement in 1973, the European Monetary System crisis of 1992, and the Mexican Peso crisis of 1994. 5 The first victim for 1971 and 1973 is taken to be Germany. Glick and Rose point out that the United States could also have been used as a first victim, but since the US Dollar was the central currency of the international monetary system, the fluctuation of the US Dollar represents more of a global shock and therefore must be ruled out. For 1992 the first victim was determined to be Finland. Glick and Rose claim that the Finnish floation was the "first important incident" of the EMS crisis. However, they admit that a case can be made for Italy too. For 1994 the first victim was clearly Mexico. The first victims and followers for the four waves of currency crises are identified in here in Table 1 .
Measuring Trade Competitiveness
We use aggregate trade data from the International Monetary Fund's Direction of Trade dataset, as provided by Andrew Rose at http://haas.berkeley.edu/~arose. The trade competition index we use is taken directly from Glick and Rose (1999) . Suppose that x i,j denotes the aggregate bilateral exports from country i ≥ 0 to country j > 0. Let i = 0 denote the first victim. Then, they propose the following importance weighted measure of trade competition between country i and first victim 0:
where x i = j =i,0 x i,j . The index is made up, roughly, of two terms. The left term in the product measures the absolute contribution of country j to the trade of countries i and 0. The term on the right weights this contribution by the importance of country j to countries i and 0. As is apparent from the definition, the export market of country j is assumed to be more important to countries i and 0 when it is of similar importance to these two countries.
Needless to say, as Glick and Rose point out themselves, this is not a perfect measure of trade competitiveness. It ignores, for example, imports, and direct trade between the countries. 6 That said, trade data is not readily available, and the current index is necessitated by the macroeconomic nature of the available data.
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The imperfect nature of the trade index makes it even more essential to consider other linkages, captured by relative geographical distance, in our regressions. We now turn to the measurement of such geographical distances.
Measuring Relative Geographical Distances
Let d i,j be the geographical distance between countries i and j. In order to compute the relative geographical distance between the first victim, country 0, and country i, we compute the following index:
This index assigns higher values to nearer countries. It assigns a zero value to the country in the sample that is farthest from the first victim.
The distance between two countries is proxied for by the smallest distance (i.e. distance "as the crow flies") between their respective capital cities. While this is clearly an imperfect measure, in practice, across large distances, it works quite well, and produces meaningful rankings of geographical distance between countries. These distances between capital cities were computed using a distance calculator provided by Darrell Kindred at http://www.indo.com/distance. This calculator uses the latitudes and longitudes of the cities concerned and then computes the distance between them by using the Geod program, which is part of the PROJ system, a set of cartographic projection tools, provided by the US Geological Survey at ftp://kai.er.usgs.gov/pub/.
Measuring Structural Similarity
Here we propose a somewhat ad hoc index of structural similarity. The idea is to extract information, based upon the available macroeconomic information, on how similar any given country is to the first victim in a narrowly macroeconomic sense. Thus, the natural quantity to look at is some weighted average of the differences between the respective macroeconomic variables of country i and the first victim.
Let 0 denote the first victim as before, and let x 0 represent the 1 × K vector of macroeconomic variables associated with 0. Thus, x i,j denotes the value of the jth macroeconomic variable for country i. Now, we define the structural similarity index as
Clearly, this index assigns larger values (smaller negative values) to countries which are closer in a narrowly macroeconomic sense (as defined by the seven macroeconomic variables available for analysis) to the first victim. It assigns its largest value, 0, to the first victim itself.
Macroeconomic Variables
The macroeconomic variables included in our analysis are taken from data provided by Glick and Rose (1999) It is important to note that all these macroeconomic variables, as well as the trade competition and relative distance indices, are expressed in unitless forms. This is naturally relevant for the later interpretation of Probit coefficients and marginal effects.
The Choice of Countries
The discussion to date has not specified which countries have been used in the analysis. We follow Glick and Rose in selecting 161 countries based upon trade volumes. Countries from the IFS database were included in our analysis if their bilateral exports to at least one trade partner in 1971 exceeded $5 million. The precise list of countries is given in the Appendix.
It is important to note that macroeconomic data is not readily available, even in the IFS database, for all these countries for all the crisis periods. Following Glick and Rose to make our results comparable to theirs, we eliminate countries from amongst the original set of 161 countries based solely upon the availability of macroeconomic data for the six variables listed above. Based upon the description provided in Glick and Rose (1999) , this represents an exact reproduction of the sample points they use for their The small resulting sample sizes after parsing by macroeconomic data availability raise pertinent concerns about the choice of technique for estimating a Probit model using this data. Classical maximum likelihood estimation is based upon asymptotic assumptions that are satisfied only as N → ∞. Since N is small here, we turn to a central point of this paper: the choice of econometric technique.
Econometric Technique
We apply relatively recent Bayesian econometric techniques to the estimation of binary currency crisis data. The theoretical framework for the Bayesian analysis of binary data was introduced by Albert and Chibb (1993) . This work represents an application of their ideas. However, the use of Bayesian techniques has been conspicuous by its absence from the empirical literature on currency crises. 9 This is specially surprising given the relevance of Bayesian analysis to understanding low probability events even with limited sample sizes. In applying Albert and Chibb's framework to currency crises, we highlight an alternative set of tools with which to empirically investigate these important but rare events.
We begin by restating the Binary Probit model presented above in Section 2. We observe a N ×1 vector of independent Bernoulli random variables y i , where for each i P r(y i = 1) = Φ(x i β) i = 1, ..., N where Φ(.) is the standard Gaussian (Normal) CDF, β is an unknown K ×1 vector of coefficients, and x is the observed N × K data matrix with x i as its ith row. Let π(β) be a prior density for β. Then, the posterior density of β given the data is:
This density is intractable. The standard asymptotic (N → ∞) approximation, assuming a uniform prior for β, is that β is distributed N K (β, I(β) −1 ) whereβ is the maximum likelihood estimate and I(.) is the observed information matrix. However, this is only approximately valid for large N . Griffiths, Hill, and Pope (1987) point out that the MLE has significant biases for small samples. In addition, Zellner and Rossi (1984) point out the inaccuracy of the normal approximation for small N . Thus, by using classical maximum likelihood methods, we are not only subject to simple biases in the actual parameter estimates, we are also likely to be mistaken in our acceptance/rejection of hypotheses based upon the assumption of normality.
Albert and Chibb propose an iterative Monte Carlo simulation technique that enables us to simulate from the exact posterior distribution of β. Their technique is based upon Gibbs Sampling/Data Augmentation, and is an application of the Gibbs Sampling algorithm of Geman and Geman (1984) and the Data Augmentation algorithm of Tanner and Wong (1987) . Gelfand and Smith (1990) point out the the close interconnections between Gibbs Sampling and Data Augmentation. We shall henceforth drop the formal distinction and refer to the process simply as Gibbs Sampling. We begin by providing a cursory overview of the Gibbs Sampling algorithm, along with the convergence results pertinent to our analysis.
Gibbs Sampling
The Gibbs Sampler is an iterative Monte Carlo technique for simulating from exact posterior distributions of vector valued parameters θ = (θ 1 , ..., θ p ). It is relevant when it is difficult to sample from the joint posterior of θ, but relatively straightforward to sample from the fully conditional distributions of θ i |θ j,j =i . Then, the algorithm starts with some initial guess for θ, say θ 0 , and proceeds iteratively to simulate according to the rule (and in the order) Ergodicity: For any measurable function F of θ whose expectation exists,
with probability 1.
Thus, by beginning with some initial guess of θ 0 , one can repeat this iterative procedure until convergence of the Markov process. Following convergence, one can obtain a simulated sample of chosen size. The ergodicity result then implies that population moments can be approximated by the corresponding sample moments in this converged simulated sample. That said, let us proceed to the application of this algorithm to the analysis of currency crisis data.
The Analysis of Binary Data
To apply the Gibbs Sampling algorithm to the binary data, we augment the Binary Probit model presented above to introduce a little more structure. We introduce a set of latent index variables z 1 , ..., z N defined as follows: For each i
where the i 's are distributed N (0, 1) and independent of each other. We now define y i = 1 if and only if z i > 0.
10 Now, the joint posterior density of the unobservables β and z given the observables x and y is π(β, z|x, y) = Cπ(β)
where φ(z i ; x i β, 1) is the N (x i β, 1) PDF, 1(.) is an indicator function which is 1 when the argument is true, and C is a proportionality constant. While it is difficult to sample directly from this posterior distribution, the Gibbs Sampler requires us only to sample from the fully conditional posteriors of β given z and vice versa. Albert and Chibb (1993) provide these fully conditional posteriors. If the prior density of β is uninformative (improper), then the fully conditional posteriors are as follows:
z i |β, x, y is distributed N (x i β, 1) truncated at the left by 0 if y i = 1 z i |β, x, y is distributed N (x i β, 1) truncated at the right by 0 if y i = 0
Given these fully conditional distributions we can now execute the Gibbs Sampler. The only remaining complexity is to sample from the conditional distribution of z, since this is a truncated Gaussian. There is more than one way to do this. We use a computationally efficient method that utilizes the Probability Integral Transform. This is described below.
Sampling from the Truncated Gaussian
The well-known Probability Integral Transformation (see, for example, Cassela and Berger 1990, pp. 52) says that if m is a continuous random variable with CDF G(.), then n = G(m) is distributed uniform on (0, 1). This result has very general application to sampling from nonstandard distributions. In order to sample from a non-standard CDF, say G(.), it is possible to simply sample values u from the standard U (0, 1) and then use m = G −1 (u) as a draw from G(.). Our purpose here is to sample from a truncated Gaussian distribution. We present in detail the case for Gaussian truncated at the left by 0.
Denote the CDF of the Gaussian with mean µ and variance 1 truncated on the left by 0 by Φ T µ,1 . Denote the corresponding untruncated Gaussian CDF by Φ µ,1 . It is easy to see that
Then, it follows that,
when v ≥ 0, 0 otherwise Now, if u is a draw from a U (0, 1) distribution, we can write
Finally, it is easy to see that for u ∈ (0, 1), v > 0, so that the only remaining problem is to invert the standard Gaussian CDF. We use an accurate method to do this described in Kennedy and Gentle (1980), pp. 95. 11 .
We are now ready to execute the Gibbs Sampler.
Details of the Sampling Procedure
We begin with the OLS estimate of β, (x x) −1 x y and sample from z|β, x, y using the method described above. Using this z, we sample from β|z, x, y. Then we use the β draw thus produced, to sample again from z|β, x, y. We continue iteratively in this way, producing a total of 30, 000 draws for each variable. We drop the first 10, 000, and retain a converged sample of size 20, 000. In practice, convergence takes place well before T = 10, 000.
Given our final sample size of 20, 000, it is now possible to compute the posterior moments of the parameters by using the corresponding posterior moments in the sample. This enables us to test hypotheses about the parameters that are of the form H 0 : β ∈ B. The hypothesis test results are reported in the form of prior and posterior odds and the corresponding Bayes factors. However, it is also of interest to compute the standard errors of the parameter estimates. This involves a non-trivial step, and is described below.
Computation of Numerical Standard Errors
As is well-known, if x 1 , ..., x N are i.i.d. draws from a N (µ, σ 2 ) distribution, thenx is distributed N (µ, σ 2 /n). However, since the Gibbs Sampler is a Markov updating process, successive draws of β cannot be treated as independent random variables. Thus, the simple estimation of the standard errors by dividing the posterior standard deviation by the square root of the sample size would significantly underestimate the standard error of the estimate. In order to correct for this we use the Batch Means method described in Bratley, Fox, and Scrage (1987) pp. 90-94. We subdivide our sample in subsamples of equal and progressively larger size until the lag one autocorrelation of the batch means is below 0.1. Then the standard error of the coefficients is computed as the standard deviation of the batch means divided by the square root of the number of batches. In a minority of cases, it was not possible to reduce the lag one autocorrelation of all the parameters to less than 0.1. In the small number of cases in which the lag one autocorrelation of the batch means was 0.3 or higher, we place an asterisk next to the numerical standard error to denote our uncertainty about its value.
A Note on Marginal Effects
Part of our results are intended to be comparable to those of Glick and Rose (1999) . Probit coefficients are not easy to interpret, since they do not represent the standard marginal effects represented by linear regression coefficients. In order to present more easily interpretable results, Glick and Rose (1999) present marginal effects rather than Probit coefficients. The marginal effects for country i in the Probit model are simply given by:
This (vector) represents the marginal changes in the probability that country i shall experience a crisis due to changes in the underlying regressors. In order to summarize representative marginal changes, the changes are evaluated at the mean of the data.
Of course, while we do know the posterior conditional distribution of β is multivariate normal, the posterior distribution of the marginal effects are not of standard form. However, it is easy to see from the above that m k ≥ 0 if and only if β k ≥ 0. Thus, we can test for the positivity, negativity, or significance of the marginal effects simply by performing the corresponding tests on the Probit coefficients with known posterior densities. Hence, when we present the results below, all hypotheses are formulated and tested in terms of the Probit coefficients rather than the marginal effects.
Collating Information Across Crisis Waves
Finally, we draw attention to the fact that all of our discussion to date has assumed a uninformative (improper) prior. While this is relevant as a means of comparison to Glick and Rose's results 12 , it is not very meaningful in an economic sense. We analyze four waves of currency crises : 1971, 1973, 1992, and 1994 . While it may be reasonable to assume an uninformative prior for the first wave of currency crises, assigning an uninformative prior to the analysis of the later waves to crises would be a misrepresentation of our state of knowledge. From each wave of currency crises we take away valuable lessons. These lessons should be brought to bear upon our analysis of the next wave of currency crises. In this way, we should ideally be able to "add up" the information we receive from the four waves of currency crises in a Bayesian sense to produce a summary of our information on how currency crises spread between countries.
Fortunately, within the Bayesian framework it is possible to do this explicitly. Within the Bayesian framework, we can use the conjugate posterior distribution from one currency crisis wave as the informative prior for analyzing the next wave of crises. Albert and Chibb (1993) point out that if β is assigned a proper conjugate N (β * , B * ) prior, then the fully conditional posterior is given by
The conditional distributions of z are as before. Thus, using these conditional posteriors, we are also able to collate our information across the four waves of currency crises. The algorithm for Gibbs Sampling is essentially identical, and we omit the details of the description.
Having thus described the various facets of our econometric methodology, we are now ready to consider the results of our analysis. These are presented next.
Results
The actual tables containing our numerical results are located at the end of the paper. In what follows we provide a key to these tables, along with a verbal summary of results and a comparison to Glick and Rose (1999) .
The results are broadly split into four sections, corresponding to the four approaches outlined above in Section 2. To refresh our memory, we briefly outline the approaches again. The control macroeconomic variables are common to all approaches. These variables measure the probability that currency crises shall occur in a follower country due to domestic factors unrelated to the first victim of a currency crisis wave. They are the rate of growth of domestic credit (abbreviated Dom. Cred. in the tables), the budget position as a percentage of GDP (abbreviated Budg/GDP), the current account position as a percentage of GDP (abbr. CA/GDP), the real rate of growth (abbr. Growth), the ratio of M2 to central bank foreign reserves (abbr. M2/Res), and domestic CPI inflation (abbr. Inflation). In addition to the macroeconomic variables, each approach considers one or more variables that serve to connect the first victim of a crisis wave with potential followers. Approach 1 considers trade competition (abbr. Trade) alone as the connecting variable. Results for this approach are presented in Tables 2 through 5 . We refer to these regressions as the "Trade Regressions." Approach 2 considers relative geographical distance (abbr. Distance) as the connecting variable. Results for this approach are presented in Tables 6 through 8 . We refer to these regressions as the "Distance Regressions." Approach 3 considers both trade competition and relative geographical distance as connecting variables. Results for this approach are presented in Tables 9 through 12 . We refer to these regressions as the "Trade-Distance Regressions." Finally, approach 4 considers both trade and relative macroeconomic similarity (abbr. Macro Sim.)together as connecting variables. 13 Results for this approach are presented in Tables 13 through 16 . We refer to these regressions as the "Trade-Structure Regressions."
There are, broadly, three classes of tables. The first class of tables lists posterior means (abbreviated p-mean in the table) and posterior standard deviation (abbreviated p-sd ) of probit coefficients starting with uninformative priors. The second class of tables (structurally identical to the first class) lists the same quantities for Probit coefficients when priors are informative (except for 1971, naturally, since it is the first wave of currency crises in our sample). In each of these two classes of tables, we present posterior means and standard deviations for each of the relevant variables, along with the numerical standard errors for each. These standard errors are placed in smaller typeface in parentheses below the posterior mean of each variable. The second class of tables contain hypothesis tests for the central connecting variables of our analysis: trade competition and relative geographical distance. In each case, we test the hypothesis that the Probit coefficient associated with the connecting variables (and hence its marginal effect) is strictly positive. The tables present prior odds (abbreviated pr-odds) and posterior odds (abbreviated pst-odds) in favor of the null hypothesis. The two rows of each such tables correspond, respectively to the case for uninformative and informative prior Bayesian processes.
Finally, since Glick and Rose (1999) present marginal effect and not Probit coefficients for their analysis, which corresponds to our first approach, for comparability, we make an exception and present the marginal effects for the trade-only regressions in Table 3 . This is done for ease of comparison to Glick and Rose (1999) only, because all tests of significance or positivity of a marginal effects are equivalent to the tests for the corresponding Probit coefficients. Accordingly, for brevity, we do not present marginal effects for the other approaches.
Broadly, our results from the first approach represent qualified agreement with Glick and Rose (1999). Glick and Rose (1999) claim that trade competition is significant and positive after controling for macroeconomic variables in determining the direction of spread of currency crises. At the same time, after including trade competition, macroeconomic variables are insignificant within the bounds of accuracy of their method. We find that trade competition is significant and positively influences the direction of spread of currency crises. When each of the currency crises periods are evaluated separately using an uninformative prior, the hypothesis that β trade > 0 is found to be valid at the 99% level for all years except for 1992, when in it is valid at the 95% level. Similarly, when the information obtained from the four crisis waves are "added" up using Bayesian updating with informative priors, the hypothesis of positivity is valid at the 95% level. However, our actual numerical marginal effects are different from Glick and Rose (1999) , though the effects are essentially identical in relative magnitude. The absolute differences in magnitude between our results and those of Glick and Rose (1999) is most likely due to the biases inherent in small-sample use of the maximum likelihood Probit estimator. Finally, unlike Glick and Rose (1999) we find significant effects from the macroeconomic controls. This should not be interpreted to be a contradiction to their results, since the signs and relative maginitudes of our coefficients are the same as theirs. The lack of significance in Glick and Rose (1999) can be seen to be due to the limit in accuracy caused by their small sample size. The Bayesian methodology, in its use of Monte Carlo simulation, is able to overcome this sample size problem, and thus represents a tighter estimate of each of these parameters.
It is relatively straightforward to summarize our results from approaches two and three. Approach two considers relative geographical distance as the sole proxy for connections between countries. In this approach, we literally test the hypothesis, "Are currency crises regional?" The answer to this question turns out to be a qualified no. While there is some evidence that the crisis of 1971 was regional in a geographical sense, the other crisis periods offer little corroboration, and sometimes contradiction to this conclusion. For example, the crisis wave of 1994 seems to have been extremely non-regional in a narrowly geographical sense. Overall, the probabilistic support for the pure geographical regionality of currency crises is weak: the Bayesian posterior probability including all four crisis periods for a positive connection between geographical distance and the spread of currency crises is only about 30%.
Approach three asks the question of whether trade competitiveness is relevant to the direction of spread of currency crises over and above the connections proxied for by relative geographical distance. Given the lack of importance of geographical distance as a pure determinant of the spread of currency crises above, it should come as no surprise that trade competitiveness is important in determining the spread of currency crises even after accounting for relative geographical distance. Our results for approach three are essentially identical to those for approach one. If anything, accounting for pure geographical distance removes some "noise" from the trade effect, and the Bayesian posterior probability accounting for all four crisis periods for a positive connection between trade competitiveness and the spread of currency crises is higher in approach three (about 99%) than in approach one (about 96%). Correspondingly, the joint evidence for distance is much weaker in approach three (around 1%) than in approach two (around 30%).
Our results from approach four adds an interesting twist to the analysis to date. In this approach we consider macroeconomic similarity in addition to trade as an explanation for the spread of currency crises. As Tables 13 through 16 suggest, the trade connection is still dominant in determining the spread of currency crises. However, the link measured by relative macroeconomic structural similarity cannot be neglected. While smaller in absolute magnitude, it is consistently significant and positive. Bayesian posterior evidence for the positive effect of macroeconomic structural similarity varies across different crisis periods: 1971 and 1992 offer stronger evidence in favor of macroeconomic similarity than 1973 and 1994. However, in each of these years, the posterior probability of a positive structural link coefficient is always close to or about 90%. The joint evidence in the Bayesian posterior accounting for all four crisis periods is quite strong, offering about a 93% probability that there is some positive relationship between macroeconomic structural similarity and the direction of spread of currency crises.
The coefficients for macroeconomic variables, are extremely small (typically two orders of magnitude smaller than the trade effect) and show little variation across the various approaches, remaining broadly consistent in sign and relative magnitude.
Discussion
Our results are broadly indicative of the fact that trade competition is important in determining the direction of spread of currency crises between countries. It is important after accounting for domestic macroeconomic and financial determinants of currency crises. Glick and Rose (1999) provided evidence that this was true. Our findings corroborate theirs. In extending their analysis we find that trade competition is important after also accounting for "other" unquantifiable links between countries proxied for by relative geographical distance. Thus, it would appear that currency speculators pay a great deal of attention to trade links between countries. During a financial crisis in one country, they do not necessarily shortsell the currencies of geographical neighbors. Instead, they sell the currencies of the trade competitors of the country under attack. These results provide evidence in favor of theories of trade-based contagion at the (indirect) cost of theories of contagion based upon institutional connections or investor-learning about regional models of development. In addition, very roughly speaking, our extensions to Glick and Rose's results provide evidence for rationality in currency crises. It is occasionally claimed that waves of currency crises occur due to irrational market frenzies, or irrational herd behavior on the part of market participants. To the extent that financial contagion is due to herd behaviour on the part of market participants, our results suggest that such herding would be better approximated by rational models of herd behavior and dynamic coordination in markets rather than irrational frenzies. The finding of rationality is further backed up by our finding that the only connection except trade that seems to matter (even in the presence of trade as an explanatory variable in the regressions) is that of macroeconomic or structural similarity. We find that even an ad hoc measure of macroeconomic similarity between countries leads to a statistically significant and consistently positive (albeit relatively small) relationship between the macroeconomic similarity of countries and the direction of spread of currency crises.
Our estimation strategy is open to criticism. We follow Glick and Rose (1999) in assuming that there is an identifiable point at which waves of currency crises begin. This may not necessarily be the case. Besides, in imposing the somewhat artificial distinction between first victims and followers, we are potentially omitting useful information. Crises appear to spread from the first victim to the followers, and then also amongst the followers. Thus, a richer analysis would involve the explication of connections between followers, rather than just between the first victim and followers. Such an approach would require a careful ranking of the exact order in which currency crises hit various countries during a crisis wave. This is an even more daunting task than the mere identification of the first victim. However, this remains a direction to be explored.
Finally, the technical contribution of this paper is to apply Bayesian econometric techniques to the problem of currency crises, and, more generally, to booms and busts in financial markets. Given the paucity of data (fixed and small N , small T ), classical methods are unlikely to ever provide a satisfactory analysis of currency crises in the near future, unless the global economic system were to experience an extremely undesirable period of excess volatility (thereby generating additional data for analysis!). Thus, the use of Monte Carlo simulation techniques within a Bayesian framework, as well as more primitive use of Bayesian techniques to appropriately collate information across waves of crises or panics, may be a better way to study important but low probability phenomena such as currency crises. The methodology taken from Albert and Chibb (1993) and highlighted in this paper is widely applicable to the analysis of phenomena such as stock market panicks, currency crises, and bank runs. Table 1 below is adapted from Glick and Rose (1999) Appendix Table A1 . It indicates which countries experienced currency crises and when. The occurence of a currency crisis in a country is indicated by a "1". Only countries that suffered from at least one currency crisis during the four periods under consideration are included. A "0" is used to denote the first victim of each wave of currency crises.
A Appendix
A.1 List of Countries Affected by Currency Crises
A.2 List of In-Sample Countries for Each Crisis Period
The initial sample in Glick and Rose (1999) consisted of 161 countries that were selected according to bilateral exports. A country was included if its bilateral exports to at least one trading partner in 1971 exceeded $5 million. For each of the crisis periods, we include as many countries as possible depending solely on macroeconomic data availability. This is the same method for constructing subsamples used by Glick and Rose (1999) and to the best of our knowledge, our subsamples are identical to theirs. The full set and the individual subsets are listed below. 
